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TRIBAL COURTS, NON-INDIANS, AND THE RIGHT TO AN 




In February 2013, Congress passed the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA).1 The previous version of the bill 
lapsed in 2011 while lawmakers argued over several controversial 
provisions. One particularly controversial provision of the Act now extends 
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians2 in cases involving couples living 
on a reservation when one partner is Indian and the other partner is not. 3 
This provision leads some to fear that non-Indians subjected to tribal court 
jurisdiction will face biased juries.  
Juries are fundamental to our system of justice, and whether the public 
views tribal court proceedings over non-Indians as fair will depend on the 
composition of tribal court juries. The fears about tribal court jurisdiction 
under the VAWA highlight how the racial composition of a jury can affect 
the perceived fairness of a trial. While concerns are valid, because the 
VAWA requires tribes to draw their jurors from sources that mirror a fair 
cross-section of the community,4 in most cases the non-Indians subject to 
tribal court jurisdiction will have access to juries composed of Indians and 
non-Indians. Thus, these juries will likely meet the constitutional test for 
                                                                                                                 
 * First-place winner, 2013–14 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition. 
 ** Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso, Tex. J.D., 
2014, University of Virginia School of Law; M.S., 2009, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 
2007, University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. Ashley Parker, House Renews Violence Against Women Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/us/politics/congress-passes-reauthorization-of-
violence-against-women-act.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 2. A note on terminology:  I will use the terms “Indian” and “non-Indian” in this paper 
rather than “Native American” and “American” as those are the terms used in the relevant 
statutes, Supreme Court cases, and scholarship.  
 3. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122. 
 4. Id. sec. 904, § 204(d)(3)(A), 127 Stat. at 122. 
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determining whether a jury is impartial that the Supreme Court set forth in 
Duren v. Missouri.  
Many of the fears about subjecting non-Indians to an unfamiliar judicial 
system with different norms and potential cultural and language barriers are 
equally applicable when Indians are tried in federal courts; yet Indians who 
have argued that they were subject to partial juries in federal courts have 
not prevailed under the Duren test.5 It may be that many of the systems the 
Duren test has upheld, while constitutionally fair, would not meet other 
standards of fairness. While tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians may 
be fair under our current constitutional standard, there may be other fairness 
concerns that cause us to evaluate how protective our current constitutional 
standard actually is.  
The VAWA’s grant of tribal court jurisdiction is needed, but it presents 
(at least) two challenges. First, the VAWA further complicates an already 
complex jurisdictional scheme by granting jurisdiction to tribal courts in a 
narrow class of cases, while leaving the remaining cases under federal (and 
sometimes state) jurisdiction. Second, the VAWA presents complex 
constitutional and federal common law issues. Whether the VAWA can 
provide the right to an impartial jury is only one of the many legal questions 
the Act’s tribal court jurisdiction provision raises.   
 Part I of this note provides a background for the discussion by 
describing the relevant provisions of the VAWA, providing necessary 
background and summarizing Supreme Court precedent regarding tribal 
court jurisdiction. Part II reviews the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury, the fair cross-section requirement and examines the fair cross-section 
challenges brought by Indians in federal court to determine the scope of this 
requirement. Part III analyzes whether non-Indians will receive impartial 
juries. Finally, Part IV looks at how the racial composition of juries can 
affect the perceived fairness of trials.  
I. Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-Indians  
On February 28, 2013, the Republican-led House of Representatives 
passed the VAWA after a long, partisan debate.6 The bill had already 
passed the Senate, but Republican concerns about the VAWA’s provisions 
expanding tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians and extending 
protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender victims and 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See infra Part II.B.   
 6. Parker, supra note 1.  
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undocumented immigrants jeopardized its passage in the House.7 The 
House Republican’s own version of the bill, which ultimately failed to gain 
enough support, had deleted those controversial provisions.8  
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians has been a subject of much 
debate since the Supreme Court ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe that tribal courts could not exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians 
under existing law.9 That decision left the federal government with the 
responsibility of prosecuting non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian 
country. According to those who advocated for the passage of the VAWA, 
however, the federal government had been lax in exercising its jurisdiction 
and prosecuting non-Indian offenders, especially in rape and domestic 
violence cases.10 To those advocates, the VAWA is a step in the right 
direction because it gives Indian women the protection and justice they 
deserve, and it gives tribes more control over their territories.11 Critics of 
the provision, however, fear that non-Indians subject to tribal court 
jurisdiction may face uncertainty, bias, and violations of their constitutional 
rights.12  
A. Violence Against Indian Women: The Problem and Solution 
Prosecuting sexual violence in Indian Country has proven difficult. For 
one thing, determining which government has criminal jurisdiction in 
“Indian country”13 is complicated. Some scholars have described Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Tom Cohen, House Passes Violence Against Women Act After GOP Version Defeated, 
CNN (Feb. 28, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/politics/violence-against-
women/. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see infra Part II.B.  
 10. Louise Erdrich, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A25 (stating 
that “prosecutors decline to prosecute 67 percent of sexual abuse cases” and that more than 
80% of sex crimes committed on reservations are committed by non-Indians).  
 11. See, e.g., NCAI Praises Passage of Protections for All Women; Tribal Courts Gain 
Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Domestic Violence Perpetrators, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. 
INDIANS (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2013/02/28/house-passes-violence-
against-women-act.  
 12. See, e.g., Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be 
Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. 
GROUPS, July 2012, at 40. 
 13. Indian country is a term of art that is defined as: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
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country as a “jurisdictional maze.”14 The federal government exercises 
criminal jurisdiction for all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian 
country.15 When the perpetrator is Indian, the federal government exercises 
criminal jurisdiction for “major crimes,” while tribal courts exercise 
jurisdiction for “minor crimes.”16 A few states have jurisdiction over some 
crimes committed in Indian Country, but they rarely exercise this 
jurisdiction.17 The VAWA creates an exception to the rule that tribal courts 
cannot exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.18 Under the VAWA, tribal 
courts may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians in “special domestic 
violence” cases.19  
Before discussing the text of the VAWA, it is important to understand 
why such a provision is necessary and why it is limited to “special domestic 
violence” cases. One might wonder why tribal courts need jurisdiction over 
non-Indians if federal prosecutors, and in some cases state prosecutors, 
already have the ability to prosecute these crimes. The answer is that crimes 
of sexual violence are under-enforced for a number of reasons. Sexual 
violence crimes are generally harder to prosecute than other crimes because 
physical evidence is often unavailable. Because rape and domestic violence 
crimes typically fall under state jurisdiction, federal prosecutors may lack 
experience prosecuting these types of crimes. Federal prosecutors also have 
                                                                                                                 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to 
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the 
same.  
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 14. See, e.g., Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions: Overcoming the Jurisdictional 
Maze to Protect Native American Women from Sexual Violence, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 
1 (2009).  
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).  
 16. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C § 1153 (2012). The statute classifies “murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, . . . felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, [and] robbery” 
as major crimes. Id.  
 17. The text of the Major Crimes Act gives states authority over the crimes not 
specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), see id., but such jurisdiction is rarely 
exercised. For a discussion of why states may choose to not exercise jurisdiction in Indian 
country, see Pacheco, supra note 14, at 23–29.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (giving certain 
states jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country).  
 18. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122. 
 19. Id. 
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limited resources, which makes travel to remote reservations impractical.20 
Moreover, there is often a cultural barrier between the federal prosecutor 
and the Indian community.21 This barrier may make victims and witnesses 
more reluctant to confide in federal prosecutors.22 There may also be a 
language barrier making communication with the federal prosecutor more 
difficult.23 Prosecutors may also consider domestic violence crimes to be 
minor compared to the other crimes that fall under their jurisdiction. 
Finally, the complex jurisdictional structure may cause confusion between 
law enforcement agencies over who has jurisdiction, since jurisdiction 
depends on the race or tribal membership of the defendant and the severity 
of the crime.  
Whatever the reasons may be for the under-enforcement of these crimes, 
sexual violence crimes are rampant in Indian country. According to the 
Department of Justice, Indian women are more than twice as likely to 
experience rape or sexual assault than women of other races.24 Non-Indian 
men commit anywhere from 60% to 80% of sexual assaults on Indian 
women.25 These statistics are not particularly surprising considering that 
non-Indians make up 77% of the residents in Indian country.26 Since non-
Indians cannot be prosecuted by tribes, and are often not prosecuted by 
federal and state courts, sexual violence crimes are grossly under-
prosecuted in Indian country.27 This startling reality of the dangers Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 729 (2006). 
 21. See id. at 710–11.  
 22. See id. at 729.  
 23. Id.   
 24. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 23 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf (“A recent study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 
the rate of violent victimization for Native Americans was more than twice the rate for the 
Nation (124 versus 50 per 1,000 persons age 12 and older).”).  
 25. See Laura E. Pisarello, Comment, Lawless by Design: Jurisdiction, Gender and 
Justice in Indian Country, 59 EMORY L.J. 1515, 1517 (2010) (citing statistics showing that 4 
out of 5 assaults are committed by non-Indian males and that over 70% of assaults are 
committed by non-Indian males); Erdrich, supra note 10 (stating that more than 80% of 
assaults are committed by non-Indians).  
 26. TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA 
NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 14 (2012).  
 27. Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian 
Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1278 (2004). 
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women face led Congress to consider expanding tribal court jurisdiction for 
these types of cases.28  
Despite the enormity of the problem, the jurisdiction provided by the 
VAWA is fairly narrow. Congress has provided concurrent federal and 
tribal jurisdiction over all persons only for “special domestic violence” 
cases.29 Jurisdiction is not authorized if both the victim and the defendant 
are non-Indian or if the defendant lacks ties to a participating Indian tribe.30 
A defendant has ties to a tribe if he:  
 (i) resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe; 
 (ii) is employed in the Indian country of the participating 
tribe; or 
 (iii) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of— 
  (I) a member of the participating tribe; or 
 (II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the 
participating tribe.31  
This language substantially narrows the non-Indian population subject to 
tribal prosecution to those with substantial relationships to Indians or Indian 
country. It excludes non-Indians who commit acts of sexual assault within 
Indian country, but who do not live or work in Indian country and are not in 
any type of romantic relationship with their victims.32 The limited nature of 
the bill ensures that those who fall under tribal jurisdiction will be at least 
somewhat familiar with the prosecuting tribe and its customs.  
                                                                                                                 
 28. Hearing on S. 1763, S. 872, and S. 1192 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein) (“[W]e heard that domestic 
violence and sexual assault against Native women is still an epidemic . . . . In response, I 
introduced . . . [the] SAVE Native Women Act.”).  
 29. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. (emphasis added). The statute is gender neutral, but I will use the male pronoun 
throughout this note as the statistics show that there is a high rate of non-Indian males 
sexually ssaulting Indian females.  
 32. This definition would exclude one potential type of defendant—the one specifically 
highlighted by Erdrich. She states that the number of sexual assaults that take place in Indian 
country increases during hunting season. See Erdrich, supra note 10. Presumably these 
hunters do not have the required ties to Indian country that would bring them under tribal 
court jurisdiction.  
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The VAWA also narrowly defines the type of conduct that subjects 
defendants to tribal jurisdiction.33 A tribe may only exercise jurisdiction if a 
defendant commits an act of “domestic violence or dating violence,” or if 
the defendant violates a protective order enforceable by the tribe while in 
Indian country.34 As defined by the statute, dating violence is “violence 
committed by a person who is or has been in a social relationship of a 
romantic or intimate nature with the victim . . . .”35 Domestic violence is 
violence committed by the “current or former spouse or intimate partner of 
the victim, by a person who the victim” (1) shares a child with, (2) 
cohabitates with (or has previously cohabited with), or (3) “by a person 
similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic- or family- 
violence laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the Indian country 
where the violence occurs.”36 The definitions of domestic and dating 
violence imply that, in most cases, there must be an existing relationship 
between the victim and the defendant, even though the Act states that a 
relationship is only one of three ways to come under tribal jurisdiction. It 
appears that the only situation where the statute does not require a pre-
existing intimate or romantic relationship is where the victim has received a 
protective order against someone who works or lives within Indian country.  
The statute also affords defendants all applicable rights provided under 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which provides most, but not all, of the 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution.37 There are a few key Constitutional 
protections missing from the ICRA, however, including the right to an 
impartial jury and the right to a grand jury.38 In recognition of this shortfall, 
the VAWA requires “the right to a trial by an impartial jury.”39 This jury 
must be drawn from sources that “reflect a fair cross section of the 
community” and “do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the 
community, including non-Indians.”40 Tribal courts must also provide 
defendants with “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the 
Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 204(c)(1) 
 35. Id. § 204(a)(1) 
 36. Id. § 204(a)(2) 
 37. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (titled “Constitutional Rights”); see also Carla 
Christofferson, Note, Trial Courts’ Failure to Protect Native American Women: A 
Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 169 n.5 (1991).   
 38. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.  
 39. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(d)(3), 127 Stat. 54, 122. 
 40. Id. sec. 904, § 204(d)(3)(A), 127 Stat. at 122. 
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affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”41 At the very 
least, these provisions try to address the concerns of critics by disallowing 
jurisdiction if non-Indians are barred from serving on juries.  
B. Tribal Court Jurisdiction:  The History and the Controversy  
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians has been a controversial issue 
since long before the debate over the VAWA. In Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, decided in 1978, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts do 
not have jurisdiction to try non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian 
Country “absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”42 The 
Court stated that the sovereignty of Indian tribes is diminished, and that 
tribes hold the territory that they do “with the assent of the United States, 
and under its authority.”43 Moreover, the Court also stated that: “[b]y 
submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian 
tribes . . . necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the 
United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”44 The basic 
theme of the Court’s reasoning, therefore, is that Indian tribes operate under 
the authority of the federal government and they have only the power that 
Congress grants them. 
To support its holding, the Oliphant Court emphasized the cultural and 
racial differences between Indians and non-Indians.45 It cited to Ex parte 
Crow Dog, an 1883 Supreme Court decision that addressed whether federal 
courts had jurisdiction over Indians who committed crimes against other 
Indians, and held that they did not.46 In so holding, the Ex parte Crow Dog 
Court noted that by subjecting non-Indians who committed crimes against 
other non-Indians to federal law, the United States was not trying Indians 
“by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their 
land” but rather by a different race. The Oliphant Court found this language 
persuasive and stated that this reasoning applies equally in the situation of 
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians as it does to federal jurisdiction 
over Indians.47 By re-affirming this language from Ex parte Crow Dog, the 
                                                                                                                 
 41.  Id. sec. 904, § 204(d)(4), 127 Stat. at 122. 
 42. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).  
 43. Id. at 209 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 571 (1846)).  
 44. Id. at 210.  
 45. Id. at 210–11 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)).  
 46. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). This case came before passage of the Major Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), which gave federal courts this jurisdiction.  
 47. Id. 
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Court seems to be saying that Indians and their laws and customs are so 
different from non-Indian, American laws and customs, that any trial in 
which one group asserts their law over the other would be unfair. Thus, the 
Oliphant Court (if not our current Supreme Court) would appear to agree 
with the critics of the VAWA who are concerned about how fair a tribal 
court exercising jurisdiction over a non-Indian can really be.  
Most criticism of the VAWA’s jurisdictional provision, and tribal court 
jurisdiction over non-Indians in general, has centered over whether tribal 
court juries can be impartial.48 In reaction to the VAWA’s tribal court 
provision, Senator Chuck Grassley stated, “[y]ou’ve got to have a jury that 
is reflective of society as a whole, and on an Indian reservation, it’s going 
to be made up of Indians, right? So the non-Indian doesn’t get a fair trial.”49 
This issue was also a key factor in Oliphant as the Court noted with concern 
that non-Indians were not allowed on juries by Suquamish Tribe.50  
Although Congress tried to allay the fears expressed by both the 
Oliphant Court and Senator Grassley by including a requirement of an 
impartial jury representing a fair cross-section of the community, there is 
still fear about how tribal court juries will treat non-Indian defendants, 
especially when the non-Indian is charged with violence against an Indian 
woman. In a heated exchange with an Indian advocacy group for sexual 
assault survivors, U.S. Congressman Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), who voted 
for the VAWA, stated that he thought due process concerns would 
ultimately lead the Supreme Court to overturn the Act.51 According to the 
account of an activist, Congressman Cramer also stated that as a non-
Indian, he now fears walking onto a reservation.52 It is notable that these 
concerns are similar to those that long have been expressed by other 
minority groups tried in state and federal courts.  
II. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement  
Juries are a fundamental element of our system of criminal adjudication, 
so it is no wonder that critics of the VAWA focus their concerns on tribal 
court juries. As the Supreme Court stated in Glasser v. United States, “the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See, for example, Senator Grassley’s comment regarding the jurisdictional 
provisions in Erdrich, supra note 10. 
 49. Erdrich, supra note 10.  
 50. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.  
 51. Luke Johnson, Kevin Cramer, North Dakota Congressman, Regrets Berating Native 
American Counselors, HUFFINGTON POST (updated Mar. 29, 2013, 10:23 AM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/28/kevin-cramer-north-dakota-native- american_n_2974676.html.  
 52. Id. 
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notion of what a proper jury is has become inextricably intertwined with the 
idea of jury trial.”53 The right to a jury trial is a “fundamental right” that 
protects criminal defendants from government oppression.54 The 
Constitution does not stop there; the Sixth Amendment requires a trial “by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”55 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to require 
that juries be “‘truly representative of the community,’ and not the organ of 
any special group or class.”56 Thus, the Constitution is not satisfied with 
just any jury. Rather, the people who comprise the jury determine whether a 
given jury is impartial.  
Congress codified this requirement, also known as the fair cross-section 
requirement, into federal law in the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act 
of 1968 (JSSA).57 The JSSA states in part:  “It is the policy of the United 
States that all litigants in Federal Courts entitled to trial by jury shall have 
the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross 
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court 
convenes.”58 The fair cross-section requirement does not require that juries 
be “representative of society as a whole,”59 but only that juries be drawn 
from sources that are representative of the community. 
A. Challenges to Discrimination in Jury Selection 
The Supreme Court began to address racial discrimination in jury 
selection soon after the Civil War.60 Prior to the extension of the Sixth 
Amendment to the states, defendants brought challenges to discriminatory 
jury selection practices under the Equal Protection clause. In Strauder v. 
West Virginia, the Supreme Court overturned the murder conviction of an 
African-American man because the state’s exclusion of African-Americans 
from jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause.61 In Norris v. 
Alabama, the Court held that Jackson County denied an African-American 
defendant equal protection of the law. In that case, even though African-
                                                                                                                 
 53. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942). 
 54. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states provide the right to a jury trial in 
serious criminal cases).  
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).  
 56. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 85–86.  
 57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (2012).  
 58. Id. § 1861.  
 59. See Erdrich, supra note 10.  
 60. Washburn, supra note 20, at 745.  
 61. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss1/8
No. 1] SPECIAL FEATURE 321 
 
 
American males were not expressly prohibited from serving on juries, no 
African-American had ever served on a jury in Jackson County.62   
The Court first applied the fair cross-section requirement to the states in 
Taylor v. Louisiana, where it found a violation of the fair cross-section 
requirement in a law that excluded women from jury service unless they 
filed a written declaration asking to serve. In holding the law 
unconstitutional, the Court said, “petit juries must be drawn from a source 
fairly representative of the community.”63  
A few years later, in Duren v. Missouri, the Court overturned a similar 
law that granted exemptions from jury service to women who requested 
them. This law resulted in a jury venire that consisted of only 14.5% 
women in a county where women made up 54% of the general population.64 
In finding the law unconstitutional, the Court stated, “any category [of 
exemptions] expressly limited to a group in the community of sufficient 
magnitude and distinctiveness . . . such as women . . . runs the danger of 
resulting in underrepresentation sufficient to constitute a prima facie 
violation of that constitutional requirement.”65  
Duren was a landmark case because it provided the framework for all 
future Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenges. In order to make a 
showing of such a prima facie violation, the Duren Court held that a 
defendant must show: 
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group 
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in 
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable 
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of 
the group in the jury-selection process.66 
Unfortunately, while it provides the necessary framework, Duren serves as 
a poor model for other fair cross-section challenges. As Indians who have 
brought fair-cross section challenges in federal courts have come to learn, it 
is difficult to make a prima facie showing of a fair cross-section violation 
                                                                                                                 
 62. 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935).  
 63. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).  
 64. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 362–63 (1979). 
 65. Id. at 370.  
 66. Id. at 364. 
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because “the underrepresentation [in Duren] was so extreme” that it “offers 
little guidance for closer cases.”67  
B. Fair Cross-section Challenges Brought by Indians in Federal Court 
Although the subject of this paper is tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indians, the fair cross-section challenges brought by Indians tried in federal 
court are useful for understanding how courts have applied Duren. As 
discussed earlier, Indians who are charged with committing major crimes in 
Indian country are tried in federal court. As one scholar has noted:  
[T]he venire from which the jury is selected is unlikely to have a 
single member of the Indian community in which the crime 
occurred. At trial, neither the prosecutor, the defense attorney, 
the marshals, nor the court security officers, the court reporter, 
the judge, or law clerks are likely to live within the community 
where the offense occurred. In many cases, the only other tribal 
member in the courtroom will be the interpreter, if one is needed, 
and the witnesses. In that sense, the tribunal may seem alien to 
the defendant, and he may not feel that he is being judged in any 
sense by his own community.68 
These issues may also be present for non-Indians facing trial in tribal 
courts; however, these concerns have not persuaded judges that Indians 
tried in federal court receive unfair trials. So far, no Sixth Amendment fair 
cross-section challenge brought by an Indian defendant has been 
successful.69  
Of course, non-Indians who bring fair cross-section challenges may 
achieve different results. One major difference between these two situations 
is that Indians are citizens of the United States. This is still true even when 
they live in a quasi-sovereign territory. As citizens, they can vote in 
elections and otherwise participate in the governance of the United States. 
Non-Indians, by definition, are not members of a tribe. Although they may 
live or work in Indian country, non-Indians may not be involved with the 
governance of Indian country.  
                                                                                                                 
 67. Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter 
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 598 (1990).  
 68. Washburn, supra note 20, at 723–24.  
 69. Id. at 755 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit joins the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in never having 
entertained a successful challenge by an Indian to an Indian country prosecution for lack of a 
jury constituting a ‘fair cross-section’ of the community.”).   
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However, it is also true that Indians tried in federal court are often tried a 
long distance away from the communities where their crimes were 
allegedly committed.70 Non-Indians tried in tribal courts will be presumably 
tried in the locality or vicinity of the crime they allegedly committed. 
Because non-Indians must have some relationship to Indian Country before 
jurisdiction can be imposed, non-Indians who are tried in tribal courts may 
have some familiarity with the tribe and the culture due to their relationship 
with a member of the tribe or the fact that they lived or worked in Indian 
country. Despite these differences, the cases challenging the lack of Indians 
in federal court jury venires may be predictive of the outcomes in cases 
challenging tribal court jurisdiction under the VAWA.  
The first requirement under Duren is to show that there is a distinctive 
group in the community that is being underrepresented in, or excluded 
from, jury selection.71 The Supreme Court did not describe what makes a 
group distinctive in Duren. In fact, the Court’s sole statement about what 
constitutes a distinct group was that women “are sufficiently numerous and 
distinct from men.”72 The “sufficiently numerous” statement suggests that a 
group has to constitute a large part of the community, but it is not clear that 
size must be a factor.  
Courts have spent little time discussing whether Indians are considered a 
distinctive group in the community. There are two reasons for the dearth of 
analysis on this point. Either the government will not dispute that Indians 
are a distinctive group, or a court will assume without discussion that 
Indians are a distinctive group.73 The size of the Indian population in a 
particular community has not factored in the analysis of this prong of the 
test, but that could be because fair cross-section challenges brought by 
Indians are often brought in states with large Indian populations (relative to 
other states).  
The second prong of the Duren test requires underrepresentation of a 
distinctive group that is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community.74 Courts use an absolute disparity 
calculation to determine whether the representation of a group in the jury 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Washburn, supra note 20, at 711–12.  
 71. Duren, 439 U.S. at 363. 
 72. Id. at 364.  
 73. See United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The government 
does not dispute that Native Americans are a distinctive group in North Dakota.”); United 
States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426 (10th Cir. 1981) (“There is no question that Indians 
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 74. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. 
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venire is fair and reasonable.75 Absolute disparity is “the percentage of 
[people within the group] on the list of persons eligible for petit jury 
service . . . subtracted from the percentage of [people within the group] in 
the general population . . . .”76 In United States v. Clifford, the Eighth 
Circuit found that the “8.4% Indian representation on petit juries [was] fair 
and reasonable when related to their 15.6% proportion of the total 
population . . . .”77 The court calculated these numbers to show “7.2% 
underrepresentation (15.6% - 8.4% = 7.2%)” of Indians in the petit jury.78 
Since the Supreme Court has held that underrepresentation of as much as 
10% does not equal substantial underrepresentation, the defendant could not 
establish a prima facie case of unfair representation.79 The court dismissed 
the argument that it would be extremely difficult to show a disparity greater 
than 10% where Indians only make up 15% of the population.80  
Under Duren, successful challenges to jury makeup have involved much 
higher disparities. For example, Duren involved a 40% actual disparity, and 
Castaneda v. Partida, an equal protection case challenging the make-up of 
a grand jury, involved a 39.5% actual disparity.81 Both Duren and 
Castaneda involved underrepresentation of groups that were the majority in 
their communities.82 Women made up slightly over 50% of the population 
in the county in Duren, and Mexican-Americans made up over 70% of the 
population in the county in Castaneda.83 Because these cases involved the 
underrepresentation of majority groups, these cases fail to aid in 
determining what type of disparity is “fair and reasonable” for minority 
groups.  
The third requirement of the Duren test is that the group’s 
underrepresentation must be due to systematic exclusion.84 Many fair cross-
section lawsuits brought by Indians address the use of county voter rolls as 
a source for jury members.85 Indians tend to be less likely to register to vote 
because, in general, they may be more invested in tribal government than 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1965)).  
 80. Id. at 155–56. 
 81. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365–66 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482, 487 (1977).  
 82. Duren, 439 U.S. at 365–66; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 487. 
 83. Duren, 439 U.S. at 359; Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 486.  
 84. 439 U.S. at 364. 
 85. United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2003).   
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the state or federal government,86 and because they face higher poverty 
rates, which makes them more likely to have moved since registering.87 
Courts, however, have not found that relying on voter rolls amounts to a 
systematic exclusion. In United States v. Morin, the Eighth Circuit said: 
“[a]bsent proof that Native Americans, in particular, face obstacles to voter 
registration in presidential elections, ‘[e]thnic and racial disparities between 
the general population and jury pools do not by themselves invalidate the 
use of voter registration lists and cannot establish the systematic exclusion 
of allegedly under-represented groups.’”88 Other courts have also upheld 
the use of voter rolls as lawful under the JSSA.89  
In United States v. Etsitty, an Indian defendant on trial for murder 
alleged that the trial court’s systematic transfer of cases from the Prescott 
Division (an area with a large Indian population) to the Phoenix Division 
(an area with a smaller Indian population) violated his right to an impartial 
jury.90 The Ninth Circuit found nothing wrong with the trial court’s 
decision to transfer cases from Prescott to Phoenix in this instance, but 
warned that the case for finding a Duren prima facie case would be stronger 
if there had been proof of a systematic transfer of cases.91 The court found a 
written policy stating that “‘all civil and criminal cases founded upon 
causes of action in the Phoenix and Prescott Division shall be tried in 
Phoenix’” was concerning, but, decided that the rule was not an issue in this 
case because the presiding judge had transferred the trial for other 
reasons.92 These cases show that defendants bringing fair cross-section 
challenges face a heavy burden. The fact that a particular defendant faced a 
jury venire or petit jury without Indians is not in itself a violation.  
III. Tribal Courts and Non-Indians 
The fact that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over non-Indians is 
problematic because non-Indians make up a majority of the population in 
Indian country. About 4.6 million people live in Indian country.93 Only 1.1 
                                                                                                                 
 86. United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 87. Washburn, supra note 20, at 748.  
 88. United States v. Morin, 338 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. 
Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 1998)).  
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983).  
 90.  United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1997), opinion amended on 
denial of reh'g, 140 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 426. 
 93. NORRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 13.  
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million of them, or 23%, identify as Indian.94 While Indian country is 
overall populated by more non-Indians than Indians, the particular 
demographics vary by reservation. For example, the two largest 
reservations by population are the Navajo Nation in Arizona, New Mexico, 
and Utah, and the Osage Reservation in Oklahoma.95 Over 97% of those 
living in Navajo Nation identify as Indian or part Indian.96 In contrast, only 
20% of those on the Osage Reservation identify as Indian or part Indian.97 
Some Indian reservations remarkably contain only a few dozen Indians. For 
example, in Oliphant, the Port Madison Reservation, the home of the 
Suquamish Indian Tribe,  “‘contained over 2900 non-Indians and only fifty 
[tribal] members.’”98  
A. A Brief History of Indian Country and Tribal Courts 
The demographics of Indian country can be readily explained by history. 
The General Allotment Act of 1887 divided reservations up into allotments 
for tribal members with left over land to be used by non-Indian 
homesteaders.99 The goal of the program was to force Indians to assimilate 
into American society. Congress thought that “[r]eservations would 
disappear over time, and the ‘Indian problem’ would be solved.”100 That 
never happened. Instead, allotment led to reservations with large non-Indian 
populations.101 “Years later, after the allotment process was abandoned, 
Congress ‘uncoupled reservation status from Indian ownership’ by defining 
‘Indian country’ to encompass all reservation lands, including that owned 
by non-Indians.”102 It was also during allotment that many Indians became 
citizens of the United States.103 Congress finally declared that all Indians 
were citizens in 1924.104  
Although run by tribal governments, the justice system that non-Indians 
face under the VAWA will not be wholly unfamiliar because tribal courts 
are highly regulated by Congress and many tribal courts are modeled after 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 14. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1999).  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 17.  
 103. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).  
 104. Id.  
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the American judicial system.105 The background of Ex Parte Crow Dog 
illustrates how tribal court systems developed. The case arose after a 
member of the Lakota Indian Tribe murdered another Lakota on the Lakota 
Reservation in South Dakota.106 A federal territorial court, unhappy with 
the tribe’s method of solving the dispute, brought criminal charges against 
the defendant, Crow Dog, but the Supreme Court overturned the conviction 
because the federal territorial court lacked jurisdiction over the 
defendant.107 Following this decision, Congress enacted the Major Crimes 
Act, which gave the federal government jurisdiction over “major crimes” 
that occurred in Indian country.108 To deal with minor crimes, the 
Department of the Interior set up Courts of Indian Offenses.109  
The federal government continued to have a role in tribal courts long 
after it helped establish them. In 1968, Congress passed the ICRA. As the 
Supreme Court noted, “a central purpose of the ICRA and in particular of 
Title I was to ‘secure for the American Indian the broad constitutional 
rights afforded to other Americans,’ and thereby to ‘protect individual 
Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.’”110 The 
ICRA guarantees Indians tried in tribal courts enjoy the same constitutional 
protections guaranteed under the Constitution, with a few exceptions.111 
The ICRA also places limits on the penalties that tribal courts can impose. 
Generally, tribal courts cannot sentence defendants to more than one year of 
incarceration and a five thousand dollar fine for any one offense, unless the 
person has been previously convicted for the same or similar offense by the 
United States.112 In cases where the person has been previously convicted, 
tribal courts cannot sentence defendants to incarceration for more than three 
years, or impose more than fifteen thousand dollars in fines.113 As already 
discussed, the ICRA also requires that defendants have a right to a trial by 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See B.J. Jones, Chief Judge, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Court, Role of Indian 
Tribal Courts in the Justice System (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.icctc.org/Tribal 
%20Courts.pdf (unpublished manuscript). 
 106. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).  
 107. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 105.  
 108. Jones, supra note 105, at 4 n.9. 
 109. Id. at 4.  
 110. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-
841, at 5–6 (1967)).  
 111. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).  
 112. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
 113. Id.  
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jury, but it only requires a jury of six people and does not require an 
impartial jury.114  
B. Tribal Courts and Non-Indian Jurors 
While the Supreme Court noted in Oliphant that the Suquamish Indian 
Tribe did not allow non-Indians to serve on juries,115 many Indian tribes do 
not have such restrictions. The Navajo Nation not only allows non-Indians 
to serve on its juries, it even has a procedure in place to ensure than non-
Indians are called to serve.116 Similar to federal courts, the Navajo Nation 
uses its own voter rolls to draw jurors.117 To ensure that non-Indians are 
represented, the tribal court clerk “also select[s] a series of names that [do] 
not appear to be Navajo from the county voter registration rolls.”118 The 
Navajo Nation has this system in place even though it is not required by the 
ICRA.119  
The Navajo Nation is not the only tribe that actively tries to recruit non-
Indians to serve on juries. The Tulalip Tribes, a union of several tribes in 
the Puget Sound region, draw their potential jurors from enrollment and 
employment records. In order to qualify for service, jurors must either be a 
“Tulalip Tribal member living on or near the Tulalip Indian Reservation, a 
resident of the Tulalip Indian Reservation, or an employee of the Tulalip 
Tribes or any of its entities, agencies, or subdivisions for at least one 
continuous year.”120 Although not explicit, this policy presumably allows 
non-Indians to serve on juries.  
Not all tribal courts, however, currently allow non-Indians to serve on 
juries. The Osage Tribe in Oklahoma, which has one of the largest 
reservations by population, does not currently allow non-Indians to serve on 
juries.121 Similarly, the Oglala Sioux Tribe in North Dakota draws potential 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. 
 115. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978). 
 116. Washburn, supra note 20, at 761. 
 117. Id.   
 118. Id.  
 119. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (containing no requirement that tribal court juries call 
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Nation has a total population of 173,667 and that 169,213 of that population identifies as 
American Indian “alone or in combination”). 
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jurors only from the tribe’s pool of membership.122 While it does not 
expressly prohibit non-Indians from serving on juries, by drawing jurors 
from membership pools, it effectively prohibits non-Indians from serving. 
Although some tribes prohibit non-Indians from serving on juries, the 
language of the VAWA clearly requires that non-Indians be allowed to 
serve on tribal courts juries (for the VAWA’s jurisdictional provision to 
take effect), as long as non-Indians comprise a distinctive group.123  
C. A Hypothetical Duren Challenge  
Although in most cases non-Indians will have access to juries made up of 
both Indians and non-Indians, there may be cases where an all-Indian jury 
tries and convicts a non-Indian defendant, even when non-Indians are not 
prohibited from serving on juries. It is important to determine how a court 
might evaluate such a case. Although the Sixth Amendment does not apply 
to tribal court proceedings,124 the text of the VAWA is modeled after the 
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement and the JSSA,125 so a court 
will likely use Sixth Amendment fair cross-section cases as a guide to 
interpret the statute.  
Similar to the first Duren requirement,126 the VAWA states that jurors 
must be drawn from sources that “do not systematically exclude any 
distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians,” but it does not 
define distinctive group in further detail.127 There are two possible 
interpretations of this language. First, Congress could have meant that non-
Indians will always be a distinctive group, and that they can never be 
systematically excluded. Second, Congress might expect that federal courts 
would look to case law to define the term “distinctive.” Federal courts 
generally take it for granted that Indians are a distinctive group in the 
community, which may be the approach that federal courts take with non-
Indians. Even if a federal court reads the statute to mean that non-Indians 
must be present in significant numbers in order to be considered a 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Oglala Sioux Tribe: Law and Order Code – Chapter 14: Rules of Court, NAT’L 
INDIAN L. LIBR., http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/oglala_sioux/chapter14-rulesofcourt.htm (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2013).  
 123. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(d)(3)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122. 
 124. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
 125. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not 
apply to tribal courts because they were not created pursuant to the Constitution).   
 126. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).  
 127. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, 
§ 204(d)(3)(B), 127 Stat. at 122. 
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distinctive group, the demographics of Indian country would mean that they 
are almost always a distinctive group. Even in Navajo Nation, where over 
97% of the population is Indian, there are over four thousand non-Indian 
residents.128 That could still be a significant number. Therefore, in most 
cases this requirement should be fairly simple to satisfy.  
The second Duren requirement, whether the disparity is fair and 
reasonable, depends on the percentage of the total population of non-
Indians eligible for jury service within the particular community. As the 
Clifford case demonstrates, it is difficult for minority groups to show a 
significant disparity.129 In the Navajo Nation, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for non-Indians to bring a successful challenge because they 
make up less than 3% of the overall population.  
Meeting this requirement might be easier on a reservation where non-
Indians outnumber Indians, like the Port Madison Reservation. In 1978, 
while the Suquamish tribe litigated Oliphant, Indians made up less than 2% 
of the population of the Port Madison Reservation.130 An absolute disparity 
of near 40% could be much easier to find in a community with similar 
demographics. If non-Indians eligible to serve on a jury made up 98% of 
the population on the reservation, but only 50% of those called to serve on 
juries, there would be a 48% absolute disparity.  
Most cases will probably fall somewhere in between these two examples. 
Of course, it is impossible to determine exactly how this analysis will be 
resolved without knowing the specific demographics of the tribe involved 
and the percentage of non-Indians that will actually serve on a particular 
jury. Nonetheless, where non-Indians are a substantial majority, meeting 
this requirement could be fairly easy.  
Finally, like Duren, the VAWA only prohibits systematic exclusions.131 
In order to find systematic exclusion, there would have to be evidence that 
the system of calling jurors to service effectively excludes all or most non-
Indians.132 While federal courts have not found that using county voter rolls 
in order to draw jurors in federal trials amounts to a systematic exclusion 
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 129. See Part II.B.  
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registering to vote,133 the same logic would not apply to tribal courts using 
only tribal membership rolls because non-Indians are excluded from tribal 
membership rolls. Therefore, in order to exercise jurisdiction, a tribal court 
must use an alternative or additional source for selecting jurors.  
Because the practices used by the Navajo Nation and the Tulalip Tribes 
are designed to incorporate non-Indians, they are unlikely to amount to 
systematic exclusions. However, because the Navajo system relies on a 
tribal court clerk to select names from the county voter rolls that do not 
appear to be Navajo,134 it may be susceptible to fraud and error. But, the 
chance of fraud or error, without evidence of such, is likely not enough to 
amount to a systematic exclusion.135  
One issue that may lead to a systematic exclusion of non-Indians is a 
tribal court’s inability to compel non-Indians into jury service. In state and 
federal court systems, jurors are compelled to attend jury duty by law 
unless they are able to receive an exemption.136 In Navajo Nation v. 
MacDonald, the Navajo Supreme court recognized that tribal courts face 
difficulties when it comes to getting non-Indians to serve as they “may not 
feel compelled to appear when summoned for tribal jury duty.”137 Since 
tribal courts only have jurisdiction over non-Indians in a limited set of 
circumstances, non-Indians cannot be prosecuted or penalized for failing to 
attend jury duty. Nothing in the VAWA gives tribal courts a method for 
compelling non-jurors to attend.  
B.J. Jones, the Chief Judge of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal 
Court, suggests that the tribal courts’ inability to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians is one reason that (he believes) non-Indians 
are (sometimes) excluded from serving on tribal court juries.138 “One 
obvious problem tribes confront when deciding who should be allowed to 
sit on tribal juries is that a non-Indian cannot be prosecuted by a tribe for 
violating his sworn duties as a juror and this may convince tribes not to 
allow them to sit.”139 The inability to compel non-Indians to serve on tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id.  
 134. Washburn, supra note 20, at 761. 
 135. See United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 426 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 136. For an example of such a law, see 38 OKLA. STAT. § 28 (2011) (“It is the policy of 
this state that all citizens qualified for jury service pursuant to this section have an obligation 
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court juries may amount to a systematic exclusion. Even so, the reasoning 
used by courts suggests that this will not amount to a systematic exclusion. 
The Ninth Circuit has said that absent evidence that Indians “face obstacles 
to voter registration in presidential elections,” the use of voter rolls did not 
amount to a systematic exclusion, because Indians could register to vote.140 
The same logic may be used here. Because nothing prevents non-Indians 
from attending jury service when they are summoned, a court may find that 
there is no systematic exclusion.  
Accordingly, it will be extremely difficult for non-Indians to prevail in a 
Duren challenge over tribal court jurisdiction. Although a successful 
challenge is unlikely, and therefore juries may be legally “fair,” 
determining actual fairness is much more difficult.  
IV. Race, Jury Selection, and Fairness 
The assumption underlying the concern over the VAWA’s expansion of 
tribal court jurisdiction is that Indians will usually side with other Indians, 
and will convict non-Indians even when there is less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. There is, however, evidence that this level of bias will not 
occur. First, tribal leaders have been working to regain jurisdiction over 
non-Indians since Oliphant was decided in 1978. As noted by Louise 
Erdrich, an advocate of the VAWA, “[t]ribal judges know they must make 
impeccable decisions. They know that they are being watched closely and 
must defend their hard-won jurisdiction. Our courts and lawyers cherish 
every tool given by Congress. Nobody wants to blow it by convicting a 
non-Indian without overwhelming, unshakable evidence.”141 Thus, because 
Congress can divest tribes of jurisdiction over non-Indians through future 
legislation, tribal leaders may have reason to be especially protective of the 
rights of non-Indians.  
Another reason to doubt that non-Indians will inevitably face bias is that 
tribal courts have not proven to be biased against non-Indians in civil cases. 
One scholar studied Navajo appellate decisions as a way to assess the 
fairness of the Navajo judicial system towards non-Indians.142 She found 
ninety-five civil cases covering a variety of legal areas where Navajo and 
non-Navajo parties (oftentimes non-Indian companies) were on opposite 
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sides of litigation.143 The non-Navajo party won 47.4% and lost 52.6% of 
these cases.144 The win-loss balance was consistent across all types of 
disputes, even child custody disputes.145 This win-loss ratio suggests that 
non-Navajo and Navajo litigants are equally able to predict their chances at 
success in litigation.146  
One context where tribal courts might be especially prone to bias against 
non-Indians is in child placement and adoption proceedings under the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Navajo Nation has declared that its 
children are its most precious resource, so it would be unsurprising “if this 
concern resulted in bias against non-Navajo parents. . . .”147 However, “not 
one of the 534 Navajo appellate cases online arises under ICWA.”148  Of the 
custody decisions not implicating ICWA, only six were between Navajo 
and non-Navajo parents, and the non-Navajo parent won four times.149 Of 
course, with such limited data and small sample sizes it is not possible to 
draw any definitive conclusions.  
Even if this data suggests that Navajo Nation court proceedings are fair 
to non-Indians, the win-loss ratio of Navajo Nation appellate court 
decisions cannot be used to suggest that all tribal courts and juries will be 
fair towards non-Indians. First, the Navajo Nation allows non-Indians on 
juries, so it would be unfair to say that this is representative of what juries 
composed entirely of Indians would do (although simply because the 
Navajo Nation allows non-Indians on jurors does not mean that non-Indians 
are actually present on every jury). Second, the Navajo Nation is the largest 
reservation in the country, so it may be that its judical system is more 
sophisticated and well funded than others. Despite the limitations of this 
data, it shows that tribal courts can be fair towards non-Indians and that a 
litigant’s (or defendant’s) status as a non-Indian does not necessarily 
determine the outcome of any particular case.  
The assumption that Indians will be biased against non-Indians is 
primarily an argument about race. Racial discrimination and jury selection 
have a long, fraught history together. In most cases, non-Indians will be 
represented on tribal court juries, but it is important to analyze why an all-
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 1075.  
 144. Id. at 1047.  
 145. Id. at 1051.  
 146. Berger goes into a much deeper discussion about what the nearly 50-50 win-loss 
rate suggests. See id. at 1074–79.  
 147. Id. at 1088.  
 148. Id. at 1090.  
 149. Id.  
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Indian jury would be so objectionable. There are some who take offense at 
the suggestion that a jury composed entirely of Indians would be biased 
against non-Indians.150 But, the type of criminal jurisdiction the VAWA 
permits is important. These are crimes of sexual assault and rape committed 
by non-Indian males against Indian females. How would one perceive the 
fairness of a trial for African-American male accused of raping a white 
female? What if all of the jurors were white?  
In McCleskey v. Kemp, McCleskey, an African-American male, was 
sentenced to death for killing a white police officer during the course of an 
armed robbery.151 McCleskey challenged his sentence under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and argued that his sentence was influenced by 
his race.152 He cited a study showing that persons who murder white people 
are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who murder black 
people and that black murderers are more likely to receive the death penalty 
than white murderers.153 Although McCleskey ultimately lost, it was not 
because the study he cited was invalid or inaccurate, but because he could 
not prove that the decision-makers in his particular case acted with a 
discriminatory purpose.154 This study speaks to a larger issue behind this 
controversy—we do not trust jurors to make decisions without considering 
race. Even if we trust that most individuals will not make decisions based 
on racial prejudice, we suspect that, in general, race may play some role in 
a jury’s decision and taint the verdict. Jurors may not go into a jury room 
and decide that a defendant deserves a death sentence solely based on the 
defendant’s race, but it is hard to imagine that race plays no role.155  
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Erdrich, supra note 10 (stating the idea that “Native people can’t be impartial 
jurists” is a “fulsome notion”).  
 151. 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).  
 152. Id. at 286.  
 153. Id. at 291; see also David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: 
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983).  
 154. Id. at 292–93.  
 155. This discussion of racial discrimination and juries is woefully incomplete. Racial 
discrimination is not just an issue when it comes to jury venire and petit juries. Racial 
discrimination is also prevalent in striking jurors. For an overview of this issue, see WAYNE 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1068–98 (5th ed. 2009) (chapter 22, “Trial by Jury 
and Impartial Judge”). In the area of peremptory challenges, there is a lot of interesting 
scholarship on the relationship between race and jury selection. The seminal case on this 
issue is Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Justice Rehnquist authored a particularly 
interesting dissent in that case. He wrote:  
In my view, there is simply nothing “unequal” about the state using its 
peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury involving black 
defendants, so long as such challenges are used to exclude whites in cases 
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The interesting aspect of the controversy surrounding tribal court 
jurisdiction under the VAWA is that the tables are turned. This time the 
ones claiming unfair treatment are not members of a racial minority, but of 
the racial majority. Non-Indians can receive fair trials in tribal courts, but a 
more accurate statement might be that non-Indians will receive trials that 
are just as fair, if not more so, as the trials that racial minorities receive in 
the American judicial system. If there are in fact cases where non-Indians 
are treated unfairly, and there may be some, it would only be fair to 
evaluate whether our judicial system as a whole grants enough protections 
to racial and ethnic minorities charged with crimes. The protections granted 
to non-Indian criminal defendants in tribal court are similar enough to the 
protections granted to criminal defendants tried in state and federal courts. 
If there is a problem with one, then there is a problem with all.  
Impartiality can be a legitimate concern with tribal court jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, but it does not mean that such jurisdiction should not 
exist. There is a great need for justice in Indian country and tribal court 
jurisdiction over domestic violence crimes is an appropriate solution, even 
if it may be imperfect. The threat of this jurisdiction alone may also be 
enough to deter future sexual assaults—at least at the high level they are 
being committed now.  
Conclusion 
How protections for minority groups may be strengthened is a subject for 
another note. This note does not try to offer a policy solution for this 
problem. Instead, the goal of this note is to highlight the parallel between 
the alarm over tribal court jurisdiction in the VAWA with concerns that 
critical race scholars have been raising for decades about how race 
permeates our justice system.  
The VAWA’s expansion of tribal court jurisdiction provides tribal courts 
with a means to address the high levels of sexual violence committed in 
Indian country. While concerns about tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indians are not unfounded, it is important to consider that this jurisdiction is 
                                                                                                                 
involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, 
Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on. 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 137. The implication of this statement seems to be that juries should not 
be composed of people of the same race as the defendant in order to eliminate racial bias in 
favor of the defendant by members of his own minority group. For scholarship on Batson, 
race, and jury selection, see Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and 
Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511.  
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needed in order to enforce sexual violence laws that otherwise go 
unenforced.  
The text of the VAWA amends the ICRA to provide jurisdiction over 
non-Indians in a limited set of cases. Jurisdiction can only be asserted when 
the defendant has an existing relationship to the Indian victim or to the 
tribe. The VAWA adequately addresses gaps that previously existed in the 
ICRA by requiring that tribal courts draw jurors from sources that reflect a 
fair cross-section of the community. Because non-Indians make up a 
substantial portion of Indian country, they will be represented on tribal 
court juries. While this note has suggested that non-Indians will receive fair 
trials in tribal courts, the debate over this issue is part of a larger debate 
about the role of race in jury selections. It may be that there is no way to 
make our jury system more representative than it currently is, or it may be 
that Duren inadequately protects defendants who are part of the minority in 
a given community and this system needs remedying. However, if members 
of Congress are concerned that the VAWA does not adequately protect the 
rights of non-Indians, then Congress should try to strengthen the protections 
for all minorities who face non-representative juries. 
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